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ESSAYS
A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE? AN
EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ASSET PROTECTION AND
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS UNDER VIRGINIA LAW
Landon C. Davis III *
Isaac A. McBeth **
Elizabeth Southall ***
I. INTRODUCTION
“A distinction without a difference”—a colloquial expression
employed by one wishing to recognize that while a linguistic or
conceptual distinction exists between any number of options, any
such distinction lacks substantive practical effect.1 To allege that
a situation presents “a distinction without a difference” is to suggest that any difference between a given set of options is a logical
fallacy—purely a creature of erroneous perception.2 When it
comes to concepts of asset protection planning and fraudulent
transfer law, one must ask whether the law draws a distinction
where there is no difference.
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1. Jessica Ellis, What Is a Distinction Without a Difference?, WISEGEEK, http://www.
wisegeek.com/what-is-a-distinction-without-a-difference.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
2. Id.
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Given the now longstanding economic downturn and the steady
increase in Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings since 2009,3 it is neither
uncommon nor unimaginable that an existing or potential client
will seek assistance in either “asset protection planning” or
“bankruptcy planning” services. These concepts tend to walk
4
hand-in-hand, although an argument could be made that “asset
protection planning” is more proactive in nature, while “bankruptcy planning” is more reactive in nature. Such an argument
notwithstanding, the desired end goal is the same—structure a
client’s holdings so as to provide the client with the greatest secu5
rity from claims of existing or future creditors.
Fraudulent transfer law, however, is designed to achieve a
completely contrary goal. It seeks to protect creditors by giving
the court power to void a debtor’s transfer of assets when such a
transfer operates to prevent a creditor from satisfying its claim
against the debtor/transferor.6 Of course, fraudulent transfer law
does not bar every movement of assets which may impact a creditor’s likelihood of being fully compensated. Rather, under Virginia law, a “fraudulent transfer” is a movement of assets falling into
one of two general categories: (i) transfers made by an insolvent
debtor for inadequate consideration;7 and (ii) transfers made by a
debtor with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.8
Although the law and the ethical rules governing its practice
certainly recognize a distinction between “asset protection plan9
ning” and “fraudulent transfers,” they do little to identify the
true difference between an intent to protect one’s assets as op3. 79% Increase in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Filers, PRLOG (July 31, 2009), http://www.
prlog.org/10297745-79-increase-in-chapter-7-bankruptcy-filers.html.
4. See John E. Sullivan III, Asset Protection Plans & Bankruptcy: Some Possible Issues, VMF0616 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 73, 114 (2005).
5. See Jack E. Owen, Jr. & Bradley G. Korell, Joint Ownership of Property as a
Method of Asset Protection, in Duncan E. Osborne & Elizabeth M. Schurig, 1 ASSET
PROTECTION: DOM. & INT’L L. & TACTICS § 12.55 (updated through April 2012); Keith S.
Kromash, Fraudulent Transfers and Conversions and Ethical Considerations, ASSET
PROTECTION IN FLORIDA § 1.25 (2d. ed. 2011) [hereinafter Kromash, Ethical Considerations].
6. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012). “All states have laws to protect
creditors from fraudulent transfers.” Duncan E. Osborne & Elizabeth M. Schurig, What
ACTEC Fellows Should Really Know About Asset Protection, in Frederick J. Tansill, Asset
Protection Trusts (Apts): Non-Tax Issues, SR019 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 547, 651 n.2 (2009) [hereinafter Osborne, ACTEC Fellows].
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
8. Id. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
9. See infra Parts III and IV.
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posed to an intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.” Indeed,
one could argue that any attempt to engage in asset protection
necessarily contemplates an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors (even though such creditors might be remote or unfore10
seeable). Conversely, a proponent of asset protection planning
would argue the two are as different as night and day.
Whatever perspective an individual adheres to, one thing is
certain: there is a distinction. There is a legal distinction. Attorneys assisting their clients in valid asset protection planning reinforce the client’s long-term security, while attorneys assisting
their clients in effecting fraudulent transfers may very well be
harming their client’s long-term security. There is an ethical distinction. Attorneys assisting their clients in asset protection
planning are fulfilling their ethical duty to represent their client
skillfully and competently, while attorneys assisting their clients
in effecting fraudulent transfers might violate a number of ethical
rules.
This essay identifies these distinctions. Part II provides a
summary description of asset protection planning and the reasoning behind the same. It also provides a brief discussion of the
substance of Virginia fraudulent transfer law and the potential
legal effects such transfers may have on a client. More importantly, this essay embraces the unenviable task of enunciating the
substantive legal and ethical difference between the two. Part III
enumerates the factors an attorney can look to in determining
whether a client’s desired goals are legitimate asset protection
planning or fraudulent transfers. Part IV discusses the ethical
implications of an attorney assisting a client in effecting asset
protection planning and/or fraudulent transfers. Finally, Part V
of this essay provides basic guidance for practitioners to follow in
order to help identify ethically questionable situations prospectively and deal with them accordingly.
II. THE LEGAL DISTINCTION
Before it is possible to understand the substantive difference, if
any, between asset protection planning and fraudulent transfers,

10. See Kromash, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5 (“[I]t would appear that asset
protection planning is meant to deceive creditors and courts.”).
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it is necessary to acknowledge and enunciate the legal distinction
between these alternate perceptions of any given transfer.
A. Asset Protection Planning
Asset protection planning generally refers to the process by
which an individual or legal entity attempts to structure its assets so as to minimize the risk that those assets may be used to
11
satisfy any given present or future liability. Although practitioners employ a wide variety of techniques to assist their clients
in asset protection planning, they generally seek to minimize any
given creditor’s ability to satisfy its claim with a debtor’s assets
through one of two ways: (i) by shifting ownership of the assets
into some “protected” form that still enables the debtor to make
12
beneficial use of the assets; or (ii) by shifting “nonexempt” assets
into an “exempt” asset class.13 Each of these techniques is addressed below.
To understand what it means to shift assets from an unprotected form of ownership to a protected form of ownership, it is
worth briefly addressing what it means for an asset to be held in
an “unprotected” form of ownership. An asset is “unprotected”
when it is subject to the creditor process by creditors of the individual or entity making use of the asset.14 The most obvious and
common form of unprotected ownership is a natural born person
15
or legal entity holding direct title to assets. For example, assets

11. Barry S. Engel, Using Foreign Situs Trusts For Asset Protection Planning, 20 EST.
PLAN. 212, 213 (1993) (“Asset protection planning is simply the process of organizing one’s
assets in advance to safeguard them from loss or dissipation by reason of potential risks to
which they would otherwise be subject.”).
12. Jacob Stein, Practical Primer and Radical Approach To Asset Protection, 38 EST.
PLAN. 21, 26 (2011) [hereinafter Stein, Primer], (“The conceptual goal of all asset protection planning is two-fold: (1) remove the debtor’s name from the legal title to the assets,
but (2) in such a way so that the debtor could retain some beneficial enjoyment and a degree of control.”).
13. Jeffrey A. Baskies, Recent Court Decision Highlights a Limit To Asset Protection
Planning, 37 EST. PLAN. 36, 36 (2010) (“Estate planners who must frequently navigate
through asset protection issues know that most of the essential elements of asset protection planning lie in our state laws, specifically in statutory exemptions from creditors.”).
14. See Paula Aiello & Eric K. Behrens, Student Loans, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code, and the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 13 J.C. & U.L. 1, 3 n.12 (1986) (recognizing
unprotected assets as those that are “non-exempt” in the context of bankruptcy).
15. See Asset Protection & Risk Management Planning, MCGAUNN & SCHWADRON
CPA’S, LLC, http://www.mcgaunnschwadron.com/asset-protection-risk-management-plan
ning/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
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owned by an individual typically are subject to attachment—i.e.,
creditors may use the judicial machinery to seize those assets and
liquidate them to satisfy the creditors’ claims.16 Another form of
ownership generally recognized as unprotected is when assets are
17
held by a revocable living trust. Although, in such a situation, a
trust technically holds the assets instead of the trust’s beneficiary, the law generally allows the beneficiary’s creditors to reach
18
the trust assets to satisfy creditors’ claims.
Conversely, holding assets in a “protected” form enables an individual or legal entity to make use of an asset while simultane19
ously placing the asset beyond the reach of creditors. Stereotypical asset protection planning of this variety involves transferring
title of the assets to a form of legal entity owned by the debtor,
such as corporations, limited partnerships, or limited liability
companies.20 Moreover, transferring assets to certain forms of
domestic or international trusts can serve a similar function.21
One of the most common forms of protected ownership employed under Virginia law is real estate held as a tenancy by the
entirety but purchased with individual assets.22 Property held by
tenants by the entirety cannot be used to satisfy creditors’ claims
against either spouse individually.23 Phrased alternatively, the
only creditor capable of reaching property held as a tenancy by
the entirety is a joint creditor of both husband and wife.24 Thus,
by using individual funds to purchase assets owned as a tenancy

16. See HOWARD L. OLECK, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 30 (1953).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-545.05 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
18. Id.
19. See Stein, Primer, supra note 12.
20. Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Note, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware Compete for the
Asset Protection Trust Market and the Wealth That Follows, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
831, 837 (1999).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951) (holding
that property held by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety is immunized from the
claims of their individual creditors) (citation omitted); Burroughs v. Gorman, 166 Va. 58,
59–60, 184 S.E. 174, 174 (1936) (same holding); Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739, 745–46, 149
S.E. 615, 618 (1929) (same holding). A tenancy by the entirety is “limited to husbands and
wives, who own the property as a unit, not by equal shares.” BARLOW BURKE & JOSEPH
SNOE, PROPERTY 225–28 (4th ed. 2012).
23. Rogers v. Rogers, 257 Va. 323, 326, 512 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1999) (“We have stated,
clearly and without equivocation, that real property held as tenants by the entireties is
exempt from the claims of creditors who do not have joint judgments against the husband
and wife.”) (citing Vasilion, 192 Va. at 740, 66 S.E.2d at 602).
24. Id.
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by the entirety, a buyer successfully shifts those assets from an
“unprotected” form of ownership to a “protected” form of ownership.
Alternatively, asset protection is achieved by shifting assets
from a nonexempt form of property to an exempt form of property.25 The term “exempt,” in the context of asset protection planning, refers to an asset that is “protected from all forms of credi26
tor process.” Similarly, the term “exemption” in such a context
refers to the actual nature of the “protection from all forms of
27
creditor process.” For example, Virginia law provides a debtor,
inter alia, a “homestead exemption,”28 a “poor debtor’s exemption,”29 and an exemption for proceeds from a personal injury law30
suit. It is important to note, however, that exemptions can be
creatures of both state and federal law, and the two might even
overlap.31 One illustration of this interplay is Virginia law’s specific exemption of certain retirement accounts to the extent they
are exempt under the Bankruptcy Code.32
The function of an exemption is to put certain assets beyond
the reach of creditors despite those assets being held by the debtor in an unprotected form. By way of illustration, a debtor who
owns a pet dog typically does not own the dog in any form of protected ownership. The dog is not property of a legal entity nor
owned as a tenancy by the entirety.33 Thus, absent some exemption to the contrary, creditors could theoretically, albeit heartlessly, subject the dog to the attachment process. In other words, a
creditor could take possession of the dog and sell it to satisfy the
creditor’s claim against the debtor. The Virginia General Assembly, however, enacted a statutory provision providing that pets

25. Richard M. Hynes, Broke But Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State
Courts, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (“Like all other states, Virginia exempts some of the
defendant’s personal property from seizure, and these exemptions will protect the meager
assets of many defaulting debtors.”).
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Repl. Vol. 2011). The Code defines creditor process as “all
methods used by creditors to collect unsecured debts.” Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 34-4 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
29. Id. § 34-26 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
30. Id. § 34-28.1 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
31. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2006).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
33. See supra notes 20, 22 and accompanying text.
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are exempt from the creditor process.34 Therefore, even though
the debtor’s dog in this hypothetical is held in an unprotected
form of ownership, the debtor’s creditors will not be able to seize
the dog and sell it to satisfy their claims.
B. Fraudulent Transfers
Fraudulent transfer law is designed to protect creditors from
certain asset transfers made by a debtor when those transfers
have the effect of depriving creditors of recovery to which they are
35
legally entitled. However, not every shift of assets that minimizes some unanticipated creditor’s recovery in the distant future
constitutes a fraudulent transfer. Rather, under Virginia law, a
creditor has the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing
evidence that a specific transfer comports with one of two statutorily defined types of fraudulent transfers.36 If a creditor is successful in making such a showing, the burden shifts to the transfer’s
proponent to demonstrate the lawfulness of the transfer.37 Failure
to carry this burden will result in the court avoiding the transfer—meaning the court will restore title of the transferred asset
to the debtor so that the asset is subject to the creditor process.38
Virginia has two statutes conferring standing on creditors to
seek avoidance of any given transfer. Virginia Code section 55-80
enables creditors to challenge transfers of assets made with the
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud those creditors from that which
they are or may be lawfully entitled.39 Virginia Code section 55-81
enables creditors to challenge transfers of assets made by insolvent debtors for insufficient consideration—i.e., consideration not
deemed valuable in law.40 Such transfers are often termed “volun-

34. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26(5) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
35. Osborne, ACTEC Fellows, supra note 6, at 655.
36. See Mills v. Miller Harness Co., 229 Va. 155, 157, 326 S.E.2d 665, 666 (1985) (citing Surratt v. Eskridge, 131 Va. 325, 335, 108 S.E. 677, 680 (1921)); Noramco Int’l v. Charlie’s Pizza, Ltd., 55 Va. Cir. 47, 47 (2001) (Fairfax County).
37. Levy v. Kindred, 854 F.2d 682, 685 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Hutcheson v. Sav. Bank
of Richmond, 129 Va. 281, 292, 105 S.E. 677, 681 (1921); Baldwin v. Winfree’s Adm’r, 116
Va. 16, 20, 81 S.E. 36, 37 (1914)); Phillips v. Moazzeni (In re Tarangelo), 378 B.R. 128, 134
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).
38. See, e.g., In re Tarangelo, 378 B.R. at 136–38 (holding that the defense’s failure to
rebut presumption of fraud resulted in avoidance of transfer/conveyance).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
40. Id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
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tary conveyances.”41 For the purposes of this essay, however,
transfers that are avoidable under section 55-81 also will be labeled “fraudulent transfers.”
Although this essay focuses exclusively on Virginia law, there
are at least two bodies of fraudulent transfer law commercial attorneys in Virginia must be familiar with: (1) Virginia fraudulent
42
transfer laws and (2) the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer
laws.43 Federal bankruptcy law recognizes the same two categories of fraudulent transfers as Virginia—albeit with different
governing standards—in addition to several others which tend to
44
be relied upon less frequently by creditors. Virginia attorneys
also would benefit from familiarity with the majority uniform
law, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), due to the
number of jurisdictions in the nation that have adopted the exact
act or some permutation of it.45
The categories of fraudulent transfers provided for in Virginia
law are sufficiently broad to ensure that almost any asset protection planning transfer could be deemed a fraudulent transfer under the right circumstances.46 For example, a debtor attempting to
transfer personal assets to a legal entity in order to place them in
a protected form of ownership could be found to have done so with
the intent to defraud some unknown creditor in the distant future
or for inadequate consideration during a period of insolvency.
Thus, while identifying the legal distinction between asset protection planning and fraudulent transfers is easy, the actual legal
difference between them is unquestionably fact-driven.
III. THE LEGAL DIFFERENCE
If Virginia’s fraudulent transfer laws are assigned their broadest possible meaning, it becomes difficult to envision a scenario in
which asset protection planning would not be considered a fraud-

41. See, e.g., In re Tarangelo, 378 B.R. at 131.
42. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
43. See 11 U.S.C § 548 (2006).
44. See id. § 548(a)(1)(A) to (B).
45. See Isaac A. McBeth & Landon C. Davis III, Bulls, Bears, and Pigs: Revisiting the
Legal Minefield of Virginia Fraudulent Transfer Law, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 273, 274 (2011)
[hereinafter McBeth, Bulls]. “Currently, Virginia is one of eight jurisdictions that has not
adopted the [UFTA].” Id.
46. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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ulent transfer.47 Indeed, one could argue that an intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud some creditor seeking recovery on a claim,
whether that creditor is known or unknown, is the only purpose
48
for individuals or entities to engage in asset protection planning.
Such an argument notwithstanding, there are internal limitations within section 55-80 and section 55-81 that, if reviewed with
a critical eye, enable an attorney to draw a broad, fuzzy line between asset protection planning and fraudulent transfers. Sadly,
absent some clear guidance from the courts or the General Assembly, that line always will be rife with plenty of gray area.
Nonetheless, the authors of this essay maintain that asset protection planning attorneys should take three factors into account
when evaluating the legal and ethical propriety of assisting a client in any given transfer. The first factor is the nature of the
debtor’s creditors. The second factor is whether any badges of
fraud can be identified in relation to the transfer. The third factor
is the nature of the client’s financial circumstances. The import of
these three factors in parsing out whether a client’s goals are
properly categorized as legitimate asset protection planning or
fraudulent transfers is discussed below.
A. Nature of Creditors
The first step an attorney should take in attempting to determine whether a client’s asset protection goals are tantamount to
fraudulent transfers is to determine whether the class of persons
or entities protected by Virginia’s fraudulent transfer statutes exist vis-à-vis the transferee. Specifically, as a threshold matter, the
transferee must have creditors in order for any given transfer to
be attacked as fraudulent.49 The relief for which Virginia’s fraudulent transfer statutes provide is not available to a party simply by
virtue of membership in the general public.50 Only creditors, pur-

47. See John E. Sullivan III, Future Creditors and Fraudulent Transfers: When A
Claimant Doesn’t Have A Claim, When A Transfer Isn’t A Transfer, When Fraud Doesn’t
Stay Fraudulent, and Other Important Limits to Fraudulent Transfers Law for the Asset
Protection Planner, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 955, 957 (1997) (observing that if majority fraudulent transfer law were assigned its broadest possible meaning, all asset protection planning would be impermissible).
48. See id. (“Simply stated, asset protection planners seek to frustrate plaintiffs who
might someday try to collect from the planner’s client.”).
49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
50. Id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (identifying voluntary conveyances void as to “creditors” and “purchasers”); Efessiou v. Efessiou, 41 Va. Cir. 142, 144 (1996) (Fairfax County)
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chasers, or other similarly situated persons have standing to invoke the statutes’ protection.51 Moreover, the scope of creditors,
purchasers, or others persons who may bring an avoidance action
varies by statute. Section 55-80 is available to a broader group of
52
creditors than section 55-81. Thus, to determine whether any
members of the statutorily protected class are present in relation
to any given transfer, an attorney must be armed with certain
background knowledge: (i) the definition of a “creditor” under applicable fraudulent transfer laws, and (ii) the scope of protected
creditors under any given fraudulent transfer law.
The term “creditor” is not defined in title 55 of the Virginia
Code, although some guidance is provided on how the term is to
53
be construed. Relying on this guidance, the learned Judge
Ledbetter observed that “[t]he term ‘creditors’ embraces all creditors who but for the transfer would have had a right to subject
the property to their debts.”54 Judge Ledbetter’s statement, which
focused on the “right” of a party as opposed to whether that party
has reduced a claim to judgment,55 appears consistent with other
judicial discussions of the issue. Namely, the Supreme Court of
Virginia explained that a “creditor” may be a party whose claim is
contingent, immature, or not yet reduced to a judgment as of the
time of the purported fraudulent transfer.56

(“The three classes of parties who have standing to bring an action under Code § 55-80 are
‘creditors,’ ‘purchasers,’ and ‘other persons.’”).
51. Efessiou, 41 Va. Cir. at 144 (citing Estate Const. Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding
Co., 14 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 1994)).
52. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (including “creditors, purchasers, or other persons”), with id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (including “creditors” and “purchasers”).
53. See id. § 55-103 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (“The words ‘creditors’ and ‘purchasers’ . . . shall
not be restricted to the protection of creditors of and purchases from the grantor, but shall
also extend to and embrace all creditors and purchasers who, but for the deed or writing,
would have had title to the property conveyed or a right to subject it to their debts.”).
54. Richie v. Grammer, 15 Va. Cir. 418, 419 (1989) (Spotsylvania County). This definition appears to be consistent with the definition of “creditor” provided for by the UFTA,
which defines a creditor as a person who has a “claim.” UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
§ 5, 7A, pt. 2 U.L.A. 14 (2006). A claim, in turn, is defined as “a right to payment, whether
or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” Id.
55. Richie, 15 Va. Cir. at 419.
56. See Luria v. Bd. of Dirs. of Westbriar Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, 277 Va. 359, 366,
672 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2009) (citations omitted); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 266 Va. 207, 213,
585 S.E.2d 533, 536 (2003).
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Virginia law further separates creditors into two classes: existing creditors and future creditors.57 The relevant point for distinguishing the two is the time the allegedly fraudulent transfer is
58
made. An existing creditor is one whose claim existed at the
time of the transfer.59 A future creditor is one whose claim arose
after the transfer.60 For the purposes of asset protection planning
and this essay, the distinction between existing creditors and future creditors is relevant because section 55-80 confers standing
on both existing and future creditors, whereas section 55-81 con61
fers standing only on existing creditors.
Any given client’s pool of future creditors may be divided further into two subcategories: (i) future creditors who are foreseeable to the transferee (“foreseeable future creditors”); and (ii) future creditors who are not foreseeable to the transferee
(“unforeseeable future creditors”).62 An example of a foreseeable
future creditor is a doctor’s patient who is scheduled to undergo
surgery after the subject asset transfer.63 An example of an unforeseeable future creditor is a motorcyclist the doctor injures in a
motor vehicle accident after the subject asset transfer.64 Admittedly, there does not appear to be any Virginia statute or case law
employing the particular phraseology of “foreseeable future creditors” or “unforeseeable future creditors.” Nonetheless, particularly in the context of asset protection planning, dividing future
creditors into the subcategories of foreseeable future creditors
and unforeseeable future creditors is consistent with court opinions from other jurisdictions, as well as scholarship on the topic of
fraudulent transfer law.65

57. Balzer & Assocs., Inc. v. The Lakes on 360, Inc., 250 Va. 527, 530–31, 463 S.E.2d
453, 455 (1995).
58. Wiebel v. Hunt, 68 Va. Cir. 191, 193 (2005) (Greene County).
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Compare id. (explaining that conveyances under section 55-80 may be challenged
by future creditors), with Battle v. Rock, 144 Va. 1, 15, 131 S.E. 344, 348 (1926) (“The
principle upon which voluntary conveyances are held void as to existing creditors is that a
man should be just before he is generous.” (emphasis added)).
62. Duncan E. Osborne & Mark E. Osborne, Asset Protection Trust Planning, ST041
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 12 (2012) [hereinafter Osborne, Asset Protection].
63. Jacob Stein, Asset Protection May Risk Fraudulent Transfer Violations, 37 EST.
PLAN. 12, 15 (2010) [hereinafter Stein, Violations].
64. Id.
65. See id.; see also Osborne, Asset Protection, supra note 62.
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Based on the foregoing, an asset protection attorney can categorize a client’s status vis-à-vis creditors into one of the following:
(a) the client maintains no existing creditors nor foreseeable future creditors, but may have unforeseeable future creditors (“Category A”); (b) the client maintains no existing creditors, but does
have foreseeable future creditors, and may have unforeseeable future creditors (“Category B”); (c) the client maintains existing
creditors but no foreseeable future creditors, and may have unforeseeable future creditors (“Category C”); or (d) the client maintains existing creditors as well as foreseeable future creditors,
and may have unforeseeable future creditors (“Category D”). Be66
cause of section 55-80’s intent requirement and section 55-81’s
67
grant of standing only to existing creditors, asset protection
planning has a higher risk of being deemed fraudulent for certain
client categories than for others.
For example, a Category A client faces the least risk that any
given asset protection planning transfer is, in reality, a fraudulent transfer. The absence of any existing creditors at the time of
the transfer eliminates all risk of a subsequent challenge based
on section 55-81.68 Although section 55-80 permits future creditors to bring an avoidance action, the statute provides that a
debtor making a transfer with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors shall be void “as to such creditors, purchasers, or
other persons.”69 This qualification within the statutory language
seems to indicate that a creditor not contemplated by the debtor
at the time of transfer would not have standing to invoke the protections of section 55-80. Given that a Category A client’s only
creditors are unforeseeable future creditors whose existence is not
known even to the client, it would be a strained argument for any
such creditor to assert that the client effected the subject transfer
with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud that creditor.
Although categories B, C, and D can be analyzed in similar
fashion, such an analysis conducted in a vacuum would be both
misleading and incomplete. The mere fact that a client has identifiable existing creditors or foreseeable future creditors, standing
alone, does not automatically merit the conclusion that all asset

66.
67.
68.
69.

See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
See id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
See id.
Id. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
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protection planning transfers made by that client are fraudulent
transfers. For example, a true millionaire who regularly makes
retirement contributions despite having a $500 Visa credit card
bill certainly has an existing creditor. However, given her financial condition, the millionaire likely is not making retirement contributions with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Visa from
recovering amounts owed to it—eliminating risk of avoidance of
70
the retirement contributions under section 55-80. Moreover, the
millionaire is not insolvent—eliminating risk of avoidance of the
71
retirement contributions under section 55-81. Indeed, such a client would be able to carry out asset planning protection transfers
with a strong sense of security that those transfers would not be
subject to subsequent challenge by way of section 55-80 and/or
section 55-81. Therefore, for an asset protection planning attorney to make a true analysis of a client’s future risks of fraudulent
transfer litigation (as well as the attorney’s risks for future ethical reprimand), she must consider whether the transfer is accompanied by badges of fraud in addition to evaluating the client’s
current financial situation.
B. Badges of Fraud
In assessing a client’s asset protection planning goals for risk of
future fraudulent transfer litigation, an attorney must determine
whether the desired transfer will be accompanied by any badges
of fraud. In essence, a “badge of fraud” is a specific type of circumstantial evidence that courts have branded as indicative of
fraudulent intent.72 Badges of fraud play no role in analyzing
whether section 55-81 applies to any given transfer, as the statute does not require an intent element.73 Badges of fraud function
only to provide evidence of section 55-80’s requisite intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.74 Their existence is necessitated
by the simple reality that a debtor seldom admits that an intent
to hinder, delay, defraud creditors accompanied his decision, for

70. See id.
71. See id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
72. Temple v. Jones, Son & Co., 179 Va. 286, 298, 19 S.E.2d 57, 62 (1942).
73. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation v. Nicolet, 62 Va. Cir. 372, 373 (2003) (Richmond City).
74. Phillips v. Moazzeni (In re Tarangelo), 378 B.R. 128, 134 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007)
(citing Hutcheson v. Sav. Bank of Richmond, 129 Va. 281, 291, 105 S.E. 677, 680–81
(1921)) (explaining the party challenging a transfer under section 55-80 may establish a
prima facie case by proving badges of fraud existed in relation to the transfer).

394

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:381

example, to sell a priceless Cadillac to Grandpa Joe for the bargain price of $1. In other words, because proving section 55-80’s
intent element would be virtually impossible if the courts required direct evidence of that intent, a court will infer fraudulent
75
intent if certain badges of fraud surround the transaction. In
Virginia, badges of fraud include:
(1) retention of an interest in the transferred property by the transferor; (2) transfer between family members for allegedly antecedent
debt; (3) pursuit of the transferor or threat of litigation by his creditors at the time of the transfer; (4) lack of or gross inadequacy of
consideration for the conveyance; (5) retention or possession of the
property by transferor; and (6) fraudulent incurrence of indebtedness
76
after the conveyance.

Attorneys should approach proposed asset protection transfers
accompanied by any of the above-mentioned badges of fraud with
caution, as a single badge of fraud is sufficient for a court to infer
the transfer was motivated by the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.77 Moreover, the court need not find that such intent was the primary or sole intent underlying the transfer.78
Thus, it appears that transfers accompanied by a mixed intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors and achieve long-term security
still fall within the gamut of section 55-80.79 That being said, the
presumption of fraudulent intent raised by badges of fraud can be
rebutted if the proponent of any given transfer can produce evidence of its bona fide nature.80 Therefore, badges of fraud should
be perceived by asset protection planning attorneys as a legal and
ethical yellow traffic light—a warning to slow down and examine
the entire situation before proceeding.

75. Id. (explaining that the court may rely on badges of fraud as proof of fraudulent
intent in the absence of direct evidence).
76. Fox Rest Assocs., L.P. v. Little, 282 Va. 277, 285, 717 S.E.2d 126, 132 (2011) (citing Hyman v. Porter (In re Porter), 37 B.R. 56, 63 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984)).
77. Moore v. Manson (In re Springfield Furniture, Inc.), 145 B.R. 520, 534 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1992) (citing Hickman’s Ex’r v. Trout, 83 Va. 478, 491, 3 S.E. 131, 136 (1887)).
78. Coleman v. Cmty. Trust Bank (In re Coleman), 285 B.R. 892, 908 (Bankr. W.D.
Va. 2002).
79. Id.
80. Balzer & Assocs., Inc. v. The Lakes on 360, Inc., 250 Va. 527, 533, 463 S.E.2d 453,
457 (1995) (“Once a party has established a prima facie case in support of its claim that a
transfer is voidable, the burden of producing evidence to rebut the prima facie case shifts
to the opposing party.”).
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C. Financial Circumstances
An honest examination of the client’s finances might be the
most certain way to assess whether fraudulent transfer litigation
is on the horizon. No attorney can make a reliable assessment of
the permissibility of a client’s asset protection goals without some
knowledge of the client’s financial standing. This is true for two
reasons: (i) section 55-80’s intent requirement is inextricably tied
81
to the financial condition of the transferor, and (ii) section 55-81
82
only applies to insolvent transferors.
Regarding section 55-80, common sense dictates that financially secure clients are in a stronger position to make true asset protection transfers than those facing dire financial straits. A debtor
making asset protection transfers while still maintaining sufficient personal assets to honor obligations to creditors seemingly
is not taking any action to the detriment of those creditors. It is
important to note, however, that even insolvent clients can be financially secure for the purposes of section 55-80.83 Indeed, insolvency alone is not a badge of fraud under Virginia law.84 If it
were, most law school graduates and many homeowners would
not be able to make lawful asset protection transfers. Rather than
using insolvency as a litmus test for a transfer’s permissibility
under section 55-80, attorneys should attempt to ascertain
whether the client’s financial condition has deteriorated to the
point that creditors are pursuing the client or threatening litigation. Such a condition, in itself, is a badge of fraud.85 Even if creditors have not yet started pursuing the client or threatened litigation, the transfer will be sufficiently problematic if the client’s
finances are such that he no longer can reasonably expect to meet
his obligations to creditors.86 In such circumstances, a court is

81. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
82. See id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
83. McBeth, Bulls, supra note 45, at 318.
84. See Hutcheson v. Sav. Bank of Richmond, 129 Va. 281, 291, 105 S.E. 677, 681
(1921) (quoting Hickman’s Ex’r v. Trout, 83 Va. 478, 491–92, 3 S.E. 131, 136–37 (1887)
(not naming insolvency among the badges of fraud)).
85. See, e.g., Fox Rest Assocs. L.P. v. Little, 282 Va. 277, 286, 717 S.E.2d 126, 132
(2011).
86. See Butler v. Loomer (In re Loomer), 222 B.R. 618, 622 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998). For
the purposes of this essay, a client who reasonably can expect to honor obligations to creditors will be termed “financially secure.” Conversely, a client who reasonably cannot expect
to honor obligations to creditors will be termed “financially insecure.”
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likely to conclude asset protection transfers are fraudulent transfers.87
Although not decided under Virginia law, the case of In re
Loomer provides guidance on this point. In that case, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska held that the debtor’s
88
prepetition retirement contributions were fraudulent transfers.
The key fact driving the court’s holding was the debtor’s decision
to make retirement contributions even after defaulting on a loan
89
agreement and franchise agreement. From the court’s perspective, these defaults marked a point in time when the debtor knew
or should have known that he no longer could fulfill his various
payment obligations, indicating the presence of the requisite in90
tent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
Unlike section 55-80, which takes a more holistic snapshot of
the debtor’s financial circumstances, section 55-81 relies on insolvency as the benchmark standard for seeking relief under the
statute.91 In Hudson v. Hudson, the Supreme Court of Virginia
discussed insolvency in the context of section 55-81.92 The court
explained that a debtor is insolvent when he has insufficient
property to pay all his debts.93 The process for conducting an insolvency analysis includes determining if the debtor’s liabilities
exceed his assets.94 In comparing the liabilities and assets, however, the court will not include the value of the property transferred as an asset of the debtor.95 Rather, the court determines
96
the net worth of the debtor following the transfer. This rule applies even in cases transferring individually held property into a

87. See, e.g., id.
88. Id. at 623.
89. Id. at 621–22.
90. Id.
91. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012), with id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol.
2012).
92. 249 Va. 335, 340–41, 455 S.E.2d 14, 17 (1995).
93. Id. at 340, 455 S.E.2d at 17 (citing McArthur v. Chase, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 683, 694
(1857)).
94. Id. at 340–41, 455 S.E.2d at 17 (citing Darden v. George G. Lee Co., 204 Va. 108,
109–11, 129 S.E.2d 897, 898–99 (1963); Gray v. McCormick, 181 Va. 52, 63–64, 23 S.E.2d
803, 808–09 (1943)).
95. Shaia v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 206 B.R. 410, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997), vacated,
244 F.3d 352, 355–57 (4th Cir. 2001) (vacated on misapplication of consideration deemed
valuable in law standard).
96. In re Meyer, 206 B.R. at 417.
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form of joint ownership, such as tenancy by the entirety.97 Additionally, the court will not include the value of any exempt property or contingent property interests held by the debtor as part of
98
the debtor’s net worth. Essentially, if the property is not capable
of being attached, it is not an asset for the purposes of solvency
calculations under section 55-81.99
Accordingly, understanding a client’s financial condition is key
to understanding the legal and ethical risks Virginia’s fraudulent
transfer law poses to a specific proposed transfer. Although a
slightly different standard should be employed when assessing
avoidability under section 55-80 as opposed to section 55-81 (i.e.,
financial stability versus insolvency), much of the information required for making either assessment overlaps and may be obtained through client interviews.
D. Using Factors to Find the Difference
There is a difference between valid asset protection planning
and fraudulent transfers. The difference, however, does not rest
in the nature of the transfer. Indeed, transferring real estate to a
legal entity so that it may be held in protected form may or may
not be a fraudulent transfer.100 It depends on the client’s circumstances. An analysis of the client’s creditors, any potential badges
of fraud accompanying the transfer, and the client’s financial
standing will yield a reliable prediction as to on which side of the
blurry “fraudulent transfer line” the client’s goals fall.101
Given the fact-driven nature of differentiating between asset
protection planning and fraudulent transfers, attempting to
enunciate a bright-line legal rule would be both long-winded and
unworkable in many situations. Nonetheless, the charts below
serve as quick reference tools in assessing the risk of subsequent
fraudulent transfer litigation in relation to any given transfer.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 420 (citations omitted).
Id. at 418; see also In re Massey, 225 B.R. 887, 890 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998).
In re Meyer, 206 B.R. at 418.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts III.A–C.
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Table Definitions:
Category A client: The client maintains no existing creditors
nor foreseeable future creditors, but may have unforeseeable future creditors.
Category B client: The client maintains no existing creditors,
but does have foreseeable future creditors and may have unforeseeable future creditors.
Category C client: The client maintains existing creditors, but
no foreseeable future creditors, and may have unforeseeable future creditors.
Category D client: The client maintains existing creditors as
well as foreseeable future creditors, and may have unforeseeable
future creditors.
Table 1: Section 55-80 Analysis Key:
AS – Category A client (financially secure)
BS – Category B client (financially secure)
BI – Category B client (financially insecure)
CS – Category C client (financially secure)
CI – Category C client (financially insecure)
DS – Category D client (financially secure)
DI – Category D client (financially insecure)
BOF – Badges of fraud accompanying transfer
NBOF – No badges of fraud accompany transfer
“+” – Transfer is likely legitimate asset protection
“-“ – Transfer is likely fraudulent transfer
“?” – Transfer is in gray area and should be heavily analyzed
NOTE: “Financially secure” means a client’s income and assets in relation to legal obligations create a reasonable expectation that the client
is capable of honoring obligations to creditors

BOF
NBOF

AS
+
+

BS
?
+

BI
-

CS
?
+

CI
-

DS
?
+

DI
-
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Table 2: Section 55-81 Analysis Key:
A – Category A client
B – Category B client
C – Category C client
D – Category D client
I – Client is insolvent
S – Client is solvent
“+” – Transfer is likely legitimate asset protection
“-” – Transfer is likely a voluntary conveyance
“?” - Transfer is in gray area and should be heavily analyzed
NOTE: “Insolvent” means that the client’s liabilities exceed the client’s
assets after excluding all property owned by the client that would not be
counted as an asset for solvency purposes from the calculation.
NOTE: This table assumes the transferor has not received consideration deemed valuable in law in exchange for the transfer.

I
S

A
+
+

B
+
+

C
+

D
+

IV. THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE
Understanding the difference between asset protection planning and fraudulent transfers offers Virginia attorneys additional
benefits beyond anticipating the legal effects of a proposed transfer. Modern ethics opinions indicate there is a cognizable ethical
difference between assisting a client in asset protection planning
transfers as opposed to effecting fraudulent transfers.102 Indeed,
an attorney found on the wrong side of the fence in this regard
might face severe ethical repercussions.103
Virginia’s Legal Ethics Opinion 1771 (“LEO 1771”) discusses a
lawyer’s ethical obligations when faced with a client who wishes
104
to effect a fraudulent transfer. Unfortunately, Virginia’s guidance on the issue is limited to this one advisory opinion. LEO
1771 examines a hypothetical situation in which a client seeks to

102.
103.
104.

VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
See, e.g., infra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.
VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
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transfer her only asset to her husband and herself as tenants by
the entirety.105 The hypothetical transfer would involve no remunerative consideration, and would place the transferred assets
106
out of the reach of the client’s creditors. LEO 1771 correctly
presumes that absent other mitigating factors, the transfer would
be void under section 55-80 and voidable under section 55-81.107
LEO 1771 provides that, under the above-described circumstances, the applicable ethical rule is Virginia Rule of Professional
108
Conduct 1.2(c) (“RPC 1.2(c)”). RPC 1.2(c) states:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of
conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or appli109
cation of the law.

The ethics committee determined that whether the lawyer
seeking guidance in LEO 1771 would be found in violation of RPC
1.2(c) hinged on a question of substantive law outside of its purview.110 Specifically, the committee determined that “[a] definitive
conclusion as to . . . whether the attorney in this hypothetical can
assist this client without violating Rule 1.2(c) would require an
analysis of whether a transfer described by §§ 55-80 and/or 55-81
constitutes fraud.”111 Therefore, aside from identifying the applicable ethical rule, LEO 1771 offers little guidance to Virginia
practitioners attempting to determine whether a client’s request-

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
110. VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012). In cases regarding different
areas of law, the ethics committee similarly has declared that a substantive legal question
regarding the legality of a particular conduct is outside the purview of the committee and
has concluded only that an attorney should not counsel his client to take the specified action where the attorney determines the conduct in question is illegal. Id. (citing id. L. Ethics Op. 1227 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (regarding whether an attorney could assist potential parents in certain steps towards private adoption); id. L. Ethics Op. 1222 (Repl. Vol. 2002)
(regarding whether an attorney could assist in a settlement involving secrecy about criminal acts in light of the statutes addressing misprision of a felony); id. L. Ethics Op. 1219
(Repl. Vol. 2002) (regarding whether an attorney could arrange for one client to loan a second client money for litigation expenses in light of the statutes addressing champerty and
maintenance); id. L. Ethics Op. 782 (Repl. Vol. 2002) (regarding whether an attorney could
advise a client separated and divorcing her husband to enter their jointly owned home in
which only the husband resided to remove her personal property)).
111. Id. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
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ed asset protection transfer—which may be subsequently avoidable pursuant to sections 55-80 and/or 55-81—would, if carried into effect, create risk of disciplinary repercussions.
A thorough examination of Virginia jurisprudence reveals no
cases nor opinions in which the above-described situation is addressed in more detail. However, other jurisdictions applying
substantively identical or substantially similar ethical rules offer
112
some guidance. The following sections address the elements of
RPC 1.2(c) in greater detail, and examine cases and ethical opinions from other jurisdictions in order to provide insight and guidance to Virginia lawyers faced with a situation occupying this
ethical gray area.
A. RPC 1.2(c)
As noted above, RPC 1.2(c) provides:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of
conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or applica113
tion of the law.

Based on this language, an attorney violates RPC 1.2(c) when
she (i) knowingly (ii) counsels a client to engage in or assists a cli114
ent in (iii) conduct which is criminal or fraudulent. In the context of fraudulent transfers, however, these requirements become
somewhat blurred.
1. Knowingly
The term “knowingly” in the context of RPC 1.2(c) “denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question.”115 It refers to a lawyer’s
knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the rele-

112. However, the author must note that “[a]lthough interpretation of similar language
in the ABA Model Rules by other states’ courts and bars might be helpful to understanding Virginia’s Rules, those foreign interpretations should not be binding in Virginia.” VA.
SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Scope (Repl. Vol. 2012).
113. Id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
114. See id.
115. Id. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology (Repl. Vol. 2012) (noting that “[a] person’s
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”).
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vant conduct.116 Phrased alternatively, RPC 1.2(c)’s “knowingly”
requirement cannot be met simply by proving that a lawyer knew
she was assisting in a transfer or knew she was advising her cli117
ent to make a transfer. To violate this rule a lawyer must know
that the transfer she advises the client to make is “fraudulent” as
defined by the Rules.118 The Rules’ unique definition of the term
119
“fraudulent” is examined more thoroughly below. Thus, it appears that a large part of determining whether a lawyer acted
ethically hinges on the lawyer’s intent. Although Virginia offers
little guidance, other jurisdictions provide some insight.
The case of In re Mirabile, from the Supreme Court of Missouri,
discusses the “knowingly” element in greater detail.120 There, Mr.
Moroney, an attorney, represented Mr. Leahy in a child support
121
hearing. At this hearing, the court held that Mr. Leahy’s current child support payments to his first wife were insufficient
based on his monthly income of $7000.122 The judge ordered that
Mr. Leahy pay an additional $1580 per month in child support
payments.123 Dismayed by the verdict, Mr. Moroney and Mr.
Leahy’s wife at the time of the hearing, Mrs. Joyce Leahy, sought
to avoid these increased payments.124 Upon hearing the verdict,
Mr. Moroney stated to the judge that Mr. Leahy could avoid the
increased child support payments by divorcing Mrs. Joyce Leahy
and transferring assets into her name.125 Mr. Moroney spoke with
Mrs. Joyce Leahy, and upon her request, recommended several
126
divorce attorneys, including Mr. Mirabile. After Mrs. Joyce
Leahy hired Mr. Mirabile, Mr. Moroney and Mr. Mirabile worked
jointly on the necessary paperwork and filed the necessary documents.127 The filing included a separation agreement in which Mr.

116. See id.
117. Id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
118. Id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012). The rules define fraud and fraudulent as
“conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation, or failure to apprise another of relevant information.” Id. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology
(Repl. Vol. 2012).
119. See infra Part IV.A.3.
120. 975 S.W.2d 936, 940–41 (Mo. 1998).
121. Id. at 937.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 937–38.
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Leahy agreed to pay Mrs. Joyce Leahy a total of $7000 in child
support and alimony each month.128 Mr. Leahy’s first wife filed a
complaint after a temporary order implementing the stipulation
was entered, and the divorce and separation agreement were lat129
er set aside by the court. Mr. Leahy and Mrs. Joyce Leahy soon
reconciled and were again living together in California when dis130
ciplinary actions against Mr. Moroney and Mr. Mirabile began.
The master of the disciplinary counsel found both attorneys to be
in violation of the state’s ethical rules.131 The master specifically
found that the timing of Mr. Leahy and Mrs. Joyce Leahy’s divorce and separation agreement, as well as the fact that Mr.
Moroney and Mr. Mirabile were their personal friends, constituted sufficient evidence to find that both lawyers acted with the
132
requisite intent to defraud Mr. Leahy’s first wife. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court of Missouri overturned the master’s finding
that both Mr. Mirabile and Mr. Moroney breached the ethical
rules.133
In support of its finding, the court noted that the Leahys’ testimony that they had desired a divorce, actually separated, and
complied with the court’s separation order was proof that Mr.
Moroney and Mr. Mirabile did not necessarily know that the separation proceeding was for the purpose of defrauding Mr. Leahy’s
first wife.134 The court wrote:
There is no evidence that the respondents encouraged Joseph Leahy
to refuse to pay his child support, nor any proof that he was ever unable to pay the child support (as he candidly testified he had the resources to pay it). The contempt order only shows that Joseph Leahy
did not want to pay the child support, and does not constitute evi135
dence of misconduct on the part of the respondents.”

The court also stated that “[l]awyers are responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared in litigation, but need not
have personal knowledge of matters asserted in documents submitted to courts because such documents contain assertions of the

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 938.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id. at 941.
Id. at 940–41.
Id. at 941 (citation omitted).
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client, not the lawyer.”136 Particularly germane to the “knowingly”
element is Judge Holstein’s discussion of Mirabile’s intentions in
filing the divorce and separation agreement in his separate opin137
ion. Judge Holstein stated:
With respect to respondent Mirabile, the evidence that he knew the
Leahys’ ulterior motive in filing the [divorce and separation agreement] is not as strong or clear as that implicating Moroney. Unlike
Moroney, Mirabile was essentially brought into this situation by a
colleague, not by an emotional, vindictive client. The extent of Mirabile’s knowledge of [Mr. Leahy’s] underlying legal controversy in [the
child support hearing against his first wife] is unclear. Mirabile was,
therefore, more likely an unwitting participant in the Leahys’
scheme. While his lack of diligence in inquiring into the details of his
client’s circumstances is troubling, it is not usually a cause for sub138
stantial discipline.

However, Judge Holstein had a different position on whether
Mr. Moroney knowingly participated in the fraudulent transfer of
assets.139 Judge Holstein stated:
A lawyer with the full knowledge of the circumstances Moroney had
at hand should at least be held to the same standard as a reasonable
person in recognizing that fraud was afoot. Without other contradictory information a lawyer might . . . believe the statements of a client. But the lawyer-client relationship does not suspend the lawyer’s
need to exercise common sense in evaluating the client’s intent to
140
commit a fraud.

The case of Florida Bar v. Cohen aligns with Judge Holstein’s
141
dissent. In Cohen, the attorney counseled his client to execute a
mortgage and note on behalf of a corporation (of which the client
was the sole shareholder) in favor of the attorney and the individual client.142 Subsequently, the attorney and client foreclosed
on the mortgage, and the attorney filed an affidavit of indebtedness claiming that the corporation owed his client and himself the
principal amount due on the note plus interest.143 The ethics

136. Id. at 940.
137. See id. at 944 (Holstein, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
138. Id.
139. See id. at 943.
140. Id. at 944.
141. See 534 So.2d 392, 392–93 (Fla. 1988) (holding that the attorney, Cohen, was
guilty of engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,
and suspending Cohen’s license to practice law for ninety-one days).
142. Id. at 392.
143. Id.
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committee’s referee determined that the attorney made these
transactions in order to allow his client to avoid paying high insurance premiums and damages owed by the transferring corpo144
ration to multiple individuals. The court sanctioned the attorney for violating Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) (“DR 7-102(A)(7)”),
“counseling or assisting his client in illegal or fraudulent con145
duct.” The fact that Mr. Cohen had a history of disciplinary
problems was germane to the court’s holding.146 The court noted
that in Cohen v. New Sunrise Investment Corp., Florida’s “Eleventh Judicial Circuit held that Cohen had transferred real properties fraudulently and ordered the conveyances to be set
147
aside.”
Although not involving fraudulent transfer law, another disciplinary case, Florida Bar v. Cohen (hereinafter referred to as
“Cohen II”), helps clarify the type of conduct that might fulfill the
“knowingly” requirement of RPC 1.2(c).148 In Cohen II, Mr. Cohen
was charged with felony conspiracy.149 The conspiracy revolved
around Mr. Cohen’s structuring of financial transactions to avoid
reporting cash transfers of $10,000 or more, in violation of title 31
of the United States Code.150 Mr. Cohen pled guilty to the charges
and revealed that he had personally concealed and received about
$640,000.151 Mr. Cohen performed these transactions on behalf of
a client who later was found to be a major drug distributor.152 The
disciplinary charges brought against Mr. Cohen focused on his
153
criminal conduct.
At his disciplinary hearing, Mr. Cohen
claimed he did not know the money at issue was the product of an
illegal operation, and that he believed the money to be the fruit of
a legitimate enterprise.154 The Supreme Court of Florida, agreeing
with the disciplinary hearing’s referee, rejected this claim:

144. Id. at 392–93.
145. Id. at 393.
146. See id.
147. Id. (citation omitted).
148. See 908 So.2d 405, 411 (Fla. 2005) (finding that Cohen “knowingly” conspired with
his client).
149. Id. at 407.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 408.
154. See id.
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We also approve of the referee’s use of common sense and logic in
making his factual findings based on the evidence presented. We
agree that it strains credulity that an attorney would believe that
$640,000 in cash delivered in plastic-wrapped $10,000 bundles for
155
storage in a safety deposit box was legitimately acquired.

Although at first blush RPC 1.2(c)’s “knowingly” requirement
appears ambiguous, comment nine of RPC 1.2(c), when read in
156
conjunction with the above cases, offers substantial guidance.
Comment nine’s provision differentiating between presenting legal analysis of a course of conduct and recommending a means by
157
which to execute fraud combined with the Rules’ permission to
prove knowledge with circumstantial evidence informs the issue.158 It seems that whether a lawyer had actual knowledge of
the fraudulent nature of the transfer depends on the extenuating
and mitigating factors surrounding it. Cohen II exemplifies this
principle; the court found it unbelievable that any reasonable
person would believe $640,000 cash in neatly packaged bundles
was earned from a legitimate enterprise.159
However, perhaps the most decisive factor in a court or disciplinary committee’s decision is whether or not the attorney can
provide a non-fraudulent explanation for the transfer. In Mirabile, the evidence that played a major role in persuading the court
to overturn the disciplinary committee’s findings was the fact the
clients actually were separated for a period of time and complied
with the court’s separation orders.160 Similarly, Judge Holstein in
his separate opinion noted that it was more likely that Mr. Mirabile lacked the fraudulent intent necessary to be found in violation of the ethical rules because he did not represent Mr. Leahy in
the original child support hearing; as compared with Mr. Moroney who had done so.161 If an attorney can show a non-fraudulent
basis for a transfer, the prosecuting body will have a very difficult
time proving that the attorney knew the transfer was “fraudulent.” This is in large part due to the unique definition of the term

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 411 (citation omitted).
See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
Id.
See id. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology (Repl. Vol. 2012).
See Cohen, 908 So.2d at 411.
See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
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“fraudulent” contained in the Rules, which is discussed in more
detail in Part IV.A.3.
2. Advising Versus Counseling to Engage or Assisting
RPC 1.2(c) forbids an attorney from assisting a client with or
counseling a client to engage in a transfer of assets that would be
fraudulent within the meaning of the Rules.162 RPC 1.2(c) does not
prohibit, however, an attorney from discussing the legal conse163
quences of a proposed transaction. The second clause of RPC
1.2(c)—“but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist
a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
164
scope, meaning, or application of the law” —supports the maxim
that a lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the actual consequences that are likely to result from a client’s conduct.165 If the client chooses to act against the attorney’s advice
and proceed in a manner that is criminal or fraudulent, the lawyer is not necessarily a party to the action.166 There is a significant ethical difference between advising a client on his legal options (including the validity, scope, and application of the law)
and “recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might
be committed with impunity.”167 Thus, if an attorney determines
that a proposed transfer constitutes fraudulent conduct, the attorney only would be permitted to “explain the legal consequences
of the client’s proposal, namely, that the transfer would be void
168
with regard to those creditors [the] client wishes to evade.”
The case of In re Hockett from the Supreme Court of Oregon
provides an excellent example of the type of behavior considered
an ethical violation.169 There, the court suspended the attorney
from practice for sixty-three days for conduct arising from his
handling of two divorce cases and related property transfers.170

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
Id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
See id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
734 P.2d 877 (Or. 1987).
Id. at 879–80.
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The court sanctioned the attorney for, among other reasons, violating DR 1-102(A)(7), which provided that an attorney shall not
“[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to
171
be illegal or fraudulent.” The attorney represented clients who
were indebted to banks and individuals in amounts approaching
$400,000.172 The conduct in question involved the attorney’s assistance and counsel in filing for divorce between the clients and
their respective wives, and subsequently transferring all of the
clients’ assets to their wives as part of each property settlement
173
The issue of whether the attorney crossed the
agreement.
boundary between merely counseling his clients and counseling
them to engage or assisting is determined easily. The attorney
174
performed the acts necessary to effect the transfer. Given that
the other requirements of “knowingly” and “fraudulent” were satisfied, the attorney violated the ethical rules.175
The case of In re Kenyon also provides a useful example of
when an attorney crosses the line separating mere advisement
and conduct that constitutes “counseling to engage or assisting.”176
This Supreme Court of South Carolina case involved the conduct
of two lawyers, Mr. Kenyon and Mr. Lusk.177 The issues revolved
around their handling of the estate of Mr. Meredith, a longtime
client of their firm.178 Prior to the purported ethical violation, Mr.
Meredith was sought by federal authorities in connection with
drug violations.179 He eventually committed suicide, and Mr. Ken180
yon and Mr. Lusk subsequently handled his estate. At the time
of Mr. Meredith’s death, there was in excess of $540,000 of claims
against his estate.181 Mr. Kenyon and Mr. Lusk provided assistance in conveying a parcel of property owned by Mr. Meredith’s
estate to a corporation of which Mr. Kenyon and Mr. Lusk were
182
sole owners. Following this conveyance, another corporation

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 881 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980)).
Id. at 879.
Id. at 880.
Id.
Id. at 881–83.
491 S.E.2d 252, 256 (S.C. 1997).
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 253–54.
Id.
Id. at 254.
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owned by Mr. Kenyon and Mr. Lusk provided a $250,000 mortgage on the property.183 Finally, the property was re-conveyed to
Mr. Meredith’s children, and the mortgage was satisfied.184 These
transactions removed the property from the estate, to which creditors would have first claim, and transferred the property directly
185
to Mr. Meredith’s children, circumventing probate. Obviously
such conduct far surpassed mere advising, as Mr. Kenyon and
Mr. Lusk had proactive roles in the transfers, ranging from constructing the necessary paperwork to actually serving as straw186
men to effectuate the transaction.
Florida Bar v. Cohen is another case in which the issue of advising versus counseling to engage or assisting is fairly straight187
forward. Here, the attorney again crossed the line between
merely advising a client of her rights and behavior that violated
the ethical rules.188 In Cohen, the attorney not only counseled his
client to execute the mortgage (in and of itself a violation of the
rule), but also assisted the client by becoming a part of the transaction and later initiating foreclosure proceedings.189
The requirement of counseling to engage or assisting is the
most straightforward of Rule 1.2(c)’s three requirements.190 In the
context of this requirement the ethical line is clear. On one end,
an attorney may discuss the implications of a proposed course of
conduct and explain the legal consequences of acting upon it. This
will not result in an ethical breach. Quite to the contrary, this
conduct is exactly the type which lawyers are expected to provide.
On the other end of the spectrum are situations in which the attorney takes an active role in the transfer, either by preparing
the documents as in In re Hockett,191 or by acting as a strawman
in more extreme cases, such as in In re Kenyon.192 These actions
clearly meet RPC 1.2(c)’s “counsel[ing] . . . to engage, or as-

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 254–55.
187. 534 So. 2d 392, 393 (Fla. 1988). This case was examined in the context of a discussion of the “knowingly” requirement of RPC 1.2(c) above. See supra Part IV.A.1.
188. Cohen, 534 S.E. 2d at 393.
189. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text.
190. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
191. See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 176–86 and accompanying text.
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sist[ing]” requirement.193 The only possible gray area exists in situations where an attorney clearly lays out how a client might effect a transfer which the attorney knows to be fraudulent, but
stops short of assisting with the transfer. In this hypothetical it is
helpful to imagine an unscrupulous attorney providing his client
a clear outline of how to make herself judgment proof, and then
adds, with a wink and a nod, that it would be unethical for the attorney to advise the client to follow that path. In such cases, the
court or disciplinary committee will face the arduous task of determining whether the attorney was merely advising the client of
the implications of the proposed actions, or counseling the client
to engage in the conduct. This determination will hinge on the evidence presented.
3. Fraudulent
In order to determine whether an attorney who counsels a client to engage in or assists a client in conducting a transfer avoidable under sections 55-80 and/or 55-81 is liable for misconduct
under RPC 1.2(c), one must look to the unique definition of the
word “fraudulent” contained in the Rules.194 The Rules define
“fraudulent” as “conduct having a purpose to deceive and not
merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another
of relevant information.”195 This definition indicates that the
transfer must be made with some degree of scienter, deceit or intent to mislead another party.196 In sum, “[w]hether or not a particular transaction is a fraudulent transfer as a matter of substantive law is not the decisive factor in applying the Rules. The
decisive factor[] [is] whether the lawyer knows that the transfer
constitutes conduct having a purpose to deceive. . . .”197 This quality of deceit seems to indicate that the conduct must be analogous
to “fraud” as the word is defined in the tortious sense. However,

193. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
194. See VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
195. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology (Repl. Vol. 2012).
196. See Denis Kleinfeld & Jonathan Alper, The Florida Supreme Court Finds No Liability For Aiding Or Abetting A Fraudulent Transfer, 78 FLA. B.J. 22, 27 (June 2004)
[hereinafter Kleinfeld, Florida Supreme Court].
197. Gideon Rothschild & Daniel S. Rubin, Asset-Protection Planning: Ethical? Legal?
Obligatory?, TRUSTS & ESTATES, Sept. 2003, at 42, 43, http://mosessinger.com/articles/
files/AssetProtectionPlanning-Ethical-Legal-Obligatory.pdf [hereinafter Rothschild, Ethical?].
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upon closer examination, it is clear this definition falls short of
what is required to prove the common law tort of fraud.
a. Fraud Versus Fraudulent
Professor Prosser in Prosser on Torts stated that the common
law tort of fraud consists of the following elements:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

a false representation of fact,
knowledge or belief that the representation is false,
an intention to induce another to act,
justifiable reliance by such person, and
198
damages resulting in such reliance.

The definition of a fraudulent transfer is vastly different. A
fraudulent transfer is not a tort; it is a remedy created by the
Commonwealth’s legislature.199 Several courts discussed the importance of this distinction within the context of ethical rules. In
Elliot v. Glushon, the Ninth Circuit “held that fraudulent transfers in the context of bankruptcy include a great variety of actions
which are not common law fraud.”200 Connecticut Informal Opinion 91-22 (“Opinion 91-22”), a hypothetical advisory opinion similar to LEO 1771, outlines the standard used by the State of Connecticut to determine whether an attorney’s conduct was
“fraudulent.”201 Opinion 91-22 deals with (among other rules)
Connecticut’s counterpart to RPC 1.2(c).202 In Opinion 91-22, an
attorney sought the advice of the Connecticut Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics as to whether the attorney
could ethically recommend or assist the attorney’s client in transferring property to the client’s wife when, at the time of the transfers, the client was indebted to a level beyond his ability to repay
his creditors.203 The opinion provides that the attorney may counsel or assist in the conduct if he does not know of any intent to
deceive and is aware of a substantial purpose other than delaying

198. William L. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 685–86 (West Publ’g Co.,
4th ed. 1971); see also Glaser v. Enzo Biochern, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 476–77 (4th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted) (applying Virginia law).
199. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
200. Kleinfeld, Florida Supreme Court, supra note 196 (citing Elliot v. Glushon, 390
F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1967)).
201. Conn. Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 91-22 (Dec. 5, 1991).
202. See id.
203. See id.
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creditors.204 If the lawyer suspects, but does not know, that the
transfer would be fraudulent, or that there is purpose to deceive,
the lawyer should give the client the benefit of the doubt.205
In In re Hockett, the Supreme Court of Oregon found similarly—that the attorney had not committed fraud or deceit in a tortious sense.206 Instead the court described the attorney’s conduct
as “intending illegally to put property beyond the lawful claims of
207
creditors.” The court held that the divorces and transfers were
part of a course of conduct designed to hinder the creditors from
208
reaching the debtor’s assets. Thus, while the attorney had not
committed the tort of fraud, the court found that the attorney, in
effecting the fraudulent transfers, possessed the intent to cheat
209
the debtor’s creditors and therefore violated the ethical rules.
Another case illustrative of the differences between a fraudulent transfer and fraud is In re Kenyon.210 There, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina held that whether the conduct involved
met the definition of a “fraudulent conveyance” was not a requirement in the context of the disciplinary proceeding.211 Instead,
the court held that the crux of such a disciplinary decision rests
in the dishonest nature of the attorneys’ conduct.212
Based on these multijurisdictional opinions, it appears that the
fact that a fraudulent transfer has been committed within the
meaning of section 55-80 or section 55-81 does not establish per
se that an attorney who assisted with the transfer automatically
violates RPC 1.2(c). Instead, the court or disciplinary committee
will evaluate the conduct to determine if the accused attorney advised the client to make the transfer with the purpose of cheating
or deceiving the creditors.213 These decisions reconcile well with
the definition of “fraudulent,” which the Rules define as “conduct

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
734 P.2d 877, 882 (Or. 1987).
Id.
Id. at 881.
See id. at 883–84.
491 S.E.2d 252, 254 (S.C. 1997) (citation omitted).
Id.
See id.
See supra notes 197–212 and accompanying text.
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having a purpose to deceive.”214 In re Mirabile outlines these concepts well.
Remember that in In re Mirabile, the Supreme Court of Missouri noted that the facts that the Leahys actually had separated
and abided by the court’s separation order were strong enough
reasons to overturn the disciplinary committee’s finding of culpa215
bility. One can assume that the court found that it was just as
likely that the attorneys assisted in the separation for the purpose of dissolving the marriage as it was that the separation was
made for the purpose of deceiving Mr. Leahy’s first wife (the creditor). In other cases such as In re Hockett or In re Kenyon, in
which the attorneys were found to violate the ethical rules, no
reasonable alternative purposes for the transfers were proffered.
Thus, it is safe to assume that the conduct in question does not
have to rise to the level of common law fraud in order to violate
RPC 1.2(c). However, it is equally clear that just because a lawyer
assists a client in a transfer that later is avoidable under section
55-80 or section 55-81 does not mean the attorney automatically
will be found to be in violation of RPC 1.2(c). It would appear that
the “fraudulent” element of RPC 1.2(c) requires conduct somewhere in between merely assisting a client with or counseling a
client to engage in a transfer which is avoidable under section 5580 or section 55-81, and an attorney committing an act which
would create liability for the tortious act of fraud. The questions
then become: exactly where is the ethical line; and when does a
lawyer cross it?
The distinction between present and future creditors will weigh
heavily on whether or not the attorney’s conduct is “fraudulent”
as defined by the Rules. As is shown below, the nature of the
creditor’s claim tends to be central in this analysis.
b. RPC 1.2(c) and Present Creditors
When a lawyer is confronted with assisting a client in a transfer of assets that will shield those assets from creditors, the ethical implications of RPC 1.2(c) largely revolve around whether the
client has any creditors and, if so, whether those creditors are

214.
215.

VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology (Repl. Vol. 2012).
See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
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present creditors or future creditors.216 Virginia case law recognizes the distinction; however, it does not thoroughly define either term.217 Although modern jurisprudence contains only sparse
discussion on the issue, courts and ethics advisory committees
that have considered the question almost unanimously hold that
assisting a client in effecting a transfer made to hinder, delay, or
defraud a present creditor is a violation of that state’s equivalent
218
of RPC 1.2(c).
One such example of an ethical violation relating to a fraudulent transfer against present creditors is found in the San Diego
Bar Association’s Ethics Opinion 1993-1, from the state of Cali219
fornia. In this opinion, the bar’s Legal Ethics Committee considered whether an attorney violated the governing ethical rules
if he advised a client to undertake certain measures to shield the
client’s assets from claims of existing and identifiable creditors.220
The committee determined such advice would be a violation because California law treats fraudulent transfers as criminal acts
and because such a course of conduct would undermine public respect and confidence in the legal profession.221 Other cases which
have been discussed above also support this result. The cases of
Hockett, Cohen, Kenyon, and Mirabile, as well as Informal Opinion 91-22 and LEO 1771 all involved situations in which a creditor’s existing right to payment had been established.222
Although Virginia law does not provide a clear definition of a
“present creditor,” a definition can be gleaned from the UFTA.
The UFTA defines a present creditor as one who had a “claim”
against the debtor before the debtor made the alleged fraudulent
transfer.223 The UFTA defines a “claim” as “a right to payment,
whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,

216. See supra Part III.A.
217. Harvey v. Fox, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 444, 449 (1834).
218. See, e.g., In re Kenyon, 491 S.E.2d 252, 256 (S.C. 1997); In re Hockett, 734 P.2d
877, 882 (Or. 1987).
219. San Diego Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 1993-1, available at http:
//www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?Pg=ethicsopinion93-1.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. See supra notes 105–06, 120–24, 169–75, 176–81, 201–03.
223. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5, 7A, pt. 2 U.L.A. 129 (2006).
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unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”224
Thus, based on the holdings of Virginia’s sister states, it would
seem that if an attorney assists or counsels a client to engage in a
transfer for the purpose of avoiding the claims of present creditors, the attorney would violate RPC 1.2(c). The analysis becomes
less clear outside the context of present creditors.
c. RPC 1.2(c) and Future Creditors
The difference between present and future creditors is that a
future creditor’s claim arises after the alleged fraudulent trans225
fer. In the context of RPC 1.2(c), it is necessary to draw a line
between foreseeable future creditors and remote future creditors.226 A foreseeable future creditor is one that possesses a cognizable connection with the transferor at the time of the transfer.227 To illustrate, “a doctor’s pool of patients is comprised of
future creditors of the doctor, as there is a foreseeable connection,
but even in this example, the foreseeability will vary for each specific doctor, as each doctor has a different likelihood of being
sued.”228 Conversely, a remote future creditor is one who acquires
a claim against the transferor subsequent to the transfer, but the
claim did not arise out of some pre-existing connection between
the creditor and the transferor.229 The distinction between foreseeable future creditors and remote future creditors is relevant to
a discussion of RPC 1.2(c) because any assistance by an attorney
in placing a debtor’s assets beyond the reach of the former, as opposed to the latter, is much more likely to constitute a violation of
RPC 1.2(c).230 This conclusion is axiomatic given the inherent difficulties in arguing that a transfer constituted conduct having a
purpose to deceive a creditor who was wholly unknown and not

224. Id. § 1, 7A, pt. 2 U.L.A. 14 (2006).
225. Stein, Violations, supra note 63, at 15.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Hurlbert v. Shackleton, 560 So.2d 1276, 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (Barfield, J., dissenting) (discussing the difficulties in concluding culpable intent on the part of
the transferor where the creditor was unforeseeable at the time of the transfer).
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foreseeable to either the transferor or the attorney at the time of
the transfer.231
A South Carolina ethics opinion illustrates the importance of
the distinction between remote and foreseeable future creditors.
In Ethics Advisory Opinion 84-02, (“Opinion 84-02”) the South
Carolina Bar Association’s Ethics Advisory Committee determined an attorney could transfer a client’s assets to protect the
232
client against potential claims of future creditors. It explained
that the “critical issue” in analyzing the propriety of the transfer
was whether there was a reasonable prospect of a judgment
against the client and, if so, if it was far removed into the distant
233
future. The committee concluded “[i]f . . . there does not exist
the immediate reasonable prospect of a judgment being entered
against the client, the transfer merely to avoid the future possibility of an action by a creditor . . . would not be [an ethical violation].”234
While Opinion 84-02 offers a nice line-in-the-sand rule, its
holding is called into question by the Supreme Court of the United States in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., v. Alliance Bond
Fund, Inc.235 Grupo Mexicano “solidified a property owner’s right
to freely transfer his property prior to judgment subject to subsequent equitable remedies under fraudulent conveyance statutes.”236 In Grupo Mexicano, a plaintiff-creditor sought a preliminary injunction against the defendant-debtor to prevent the
237
transfer of the defendant’s assets during the trial. Kleinfeld and
Alper succinctly summarize the Supreme Court’s holding:
The Supreme Court stated, “It was well established, however, that,
as a general rule, a creditor’s bill could be brought only by a creditor
who had already obtained a judgment establishing the debt.” The
Court reiterated its understanding of the well-established general

231. Id.; see also Kromash, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, § 1.15 to 1.29 (discussing the implications of future creditor status as it pertains to attorney ethics and asset
protection).
232. S.C. Bar Ass’n Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 84-02 (1984), available at http://www.scbar.org/MemberResources/EthicsAdvisoryOpinions/OpinionView/Artic
leID/227/Ethics-Advisory-Opinion-84-02.aspx.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See 527 U.S. 308, 319–21 (1999).
236. See Kleinfeld, Florida Supreme Court, supra note 196, at 26.
237. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 310; see also Kleinfeld, Florida Supreme Court, supra
note 196, at 26.

2012]

ASSET PROTECTION AND FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS

417

rule, “that a judgment establishing the debt was necessary before a
court of equity would interfere with the debtor’s use of his property.” In other words, under common law a creditor has no property interest in the assets of a debtor prior to the creditor obtaining a
judgment, and before judgment, a debtor’s property is freely alienable.
The point is that all people, even potential debtors, have fundamental rights to protect and control their property. The transfer of
freely alienable property is not unlawful and cannot be restrained by
a creditor, absent obtaining remedies allowed under other statutory
law such as bankruptcy, even if the transfer could subsequently be
238
challenged under fraudulent transfer statutes.

The Supreme Court’s decision seems to be at odds with the
holdings of Ethics Opinion 84-02, which provides that it constitutes an ethical violation for an attorney to counsel a client to engage or assist a client with a fraudulent transfer for the purpose
of avoiding foreseeable future creditors.239 Certainly, if the Supreme Court has stated that it is the right of all people to control
their assets, absent an adverse right to those assets in the form of
a judgment or pre-existing claim,240 then it would be unjust to
punish lawyers who help individuals to exercise this right. When
examined in the context of the Rules’ definition of the term
fraudulent (“having the purpose to deceive”), the same result is
reached.241 How can a lawful transfer of property, which the attorney’s client has the sole right to control, be considered deceitful?
The authors submit that this question can be answered by examining the context in which the Supreme Court made their decision in Grupo Mexicano. First and foremost, the case involved a
prayer for a preliminary injunction.242 The Court’s decision was
founded in the idea that
[t]he rule requiring a judgment [before attachment would be allowed] was a product, not just of the procedural requirements that
remedies at law had to be exhausted before equitable remedies could
be pursued, but also of the substantive rule that a general creditor

238. Kleinfeld, Florida Supreme Court, supra note 196, at 26 (quoting Grupo Mexicano,
527 U.S. at 319–21).
239. See supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text.
240. See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319.
241. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology (Repl. Vol. 2012).
242. Groupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 310.
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(one without a judgment) had no cognizable interest, either at law or
in equity, in the property of his debtor, and therefore, could not in243
terfere with the debtor’s use of that property.

This is consistent with the classification of fraudulent transfer
statutes as remedial, and not preemptive, tools. Thus, despite the
fact a debtor may have every right to make a transfer, a lawyer
who assists a client with the same transfer can be held culpable
under RPC 1.2(c) if the purpose of the transfer was to deceive
244
While this analysis may seem counterintuitive, it
creditors.
must be remembered that an attorney’s ethical obligations may
be more restrictive on an attorney’s conduct than the client’s
“bare legal rights.” Phrased alternatively, just because an attorney’s client has a legal right to pursue a particular course of conduct, it does not necessarily follow that the attorney would be acting ethically if the attorney stood solely on the client’s right. For
example, an attorney is prohibited under the ethics rules from directly contacting an adverse party who is represented by counsel—despite that the client has the legal right to directly reach
245
out to the adverse party for settlement or any other purposes.
4. Summary
Certainly, a Virginia lawyer may engage in asset protection
planning—one would be hard-pressed to argue, for example, that
a lawyer cannot advise clients who desire to start a real estate
investment business that they should utilize a limited liability
company versus a general partnership business structure.246 Or,
that a surgeon not protect her assets from the threat of a malpractice suit by placing those assets in a trust, or by owning the
assets as tenants by the entirety with her husband. On the other
hand, one would be equally hard-pressed to argue that the attorneys’ behavior in the In re Hockett or Cohen cases examined
above was ethically proper.

243. Rothschild, Ethical?, supra note 197, at 44 (quoting Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at
319–20) (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
244. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
245. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 4.2 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
246. See Gideon Rothschild & Daniel S. Rubin, Asset Protection Planning, 810-3D TAX
MANAGEMENT, at A-8 (2011) (explaining that a more significant question is whether a particular fraudulent transfer has a substantial purpose other than to delay or burden third
parties).
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As is often the case, the difficulties arise in the middle ground,
in the situations where there is not a clear violation. This essay
outlines what an attorney must do in order to violate RPC 1.2(c).
First, he must act with the requisite mens rea. In the context of
RPC 1.2(c), the applicable mens rea is defined by the term “knowingly.” The Rules define “knowingly” as having actual knowledge
247
of the facts in question. This actual knowledge can be proven by
circumstantial evidence, and the result will vary from case to
case.248 Some jurisdictions seem to apply a reasonable person
249
standard, while others seem to focus on whether there was a
non-fraudulent explanation for the transfer.250
Secondly, in order to be found in violation of RPC 1.2(c) the attorney’s conduct must consist of counseling a client to engage in,
251
or assisting a client with the allegedly fraudulent transfer. This
requirement is the clearest of the three. On one hand, it is not only ethically proper, but professionally expected, that a lawyer will
advise a client of the legal consequences of a proposed transfer.
On the other hand, an attorney clearly cannot assist the client in
effecting a transfer in violation of RPC 1.2(c). This forbidden assistance includes becoming a party to the transfer,252 or simply
preparing and filing documents.253 Furthermore, an attorney cannot step back from actually assisting in the transfer only to instruct a client to engage in the forbidden conduct. This situation
has not been examined in any available cases, disciplinary hearings, or opinions, most likely because the proof required to find a
violation would be very difficult to obtain.
Finally, the transfer at issue must qualify as “fraudulent.”254 As
noted, the Rules provide a unique definition of the word.255 Many
courts and scholarly sources agree that a lawyer will not run
afoul of the ethical rules simply because he or she effects a transfer which is later held to be avoidable under section 55-80 or sec-
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See Florida Bar v. Cohen, 908 So.2d 405, 411 (Fla. 2005).
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VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
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See supra Part IV.A.3.
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tion 55-81.256 The same courts and scholars agree that the conduct
does not have to equate to common law fraud.257 Again the line is
somewhere in the gray area. This ethical line is illuminated
slightly by examining the differences between present, future
foreseeable, and future remote creditors. If the “knowingly” requirement is met, an attorney’s assistance in a transfer to avoid a
client’s present creditors most likely will be fraudulent and thus a
258
violation of RPC 1.2(c). On the other end of the spectrum, if a
lawyer knowingly assists a client in transferring assets outside of
the reach of future remote creditors, he most likely will not be
259
found in violation of RPC 1.2(c). Therefore, once again, the ethical line is in the middle ground, accompanied by the class of individuals known as foreseeable future creditors.
The final section strives to provide guidance as to how a Virginia practitioner can avoid running afoul of RPC 1.2(c) in unclear
situations, such as those in which foreseeable future creditors are
involved.
V. GUIDANCE
In the context of asset protection planning, the truism “with
great power comes great responsibility” holds fast. Lawyers assisting clients with asset protection planning have great power to
shield clients’ assets from creditors, thereby providing peace of
mind and long-term financial security. However lawyers, as officers of the court, also have a great responsibility not only to their
clients, but also to the judicial system and society as a whole to
act within the bounds of the law and comply with ethical stand260
ards provided by the profession.
In order for a lawyer to avoid an ethical breach when assisting
a client with a transfer of the client’s assets, she should ensure
that the transfer is not being made for the purpose of deceiving
creditors. One scholar suggests that a lawyer should become fully
informed of the client’s standing vis-à-vis present creditors as a

256. See supra Part IV.A.3.a.
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258. See supra Part IV.A.3.b.
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260. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble (Repl. Vol. 2012); In re Giffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 724 n.14 (1973).
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part of the lawyer’s due diligence.261 Due diligence in this context
means “the attorney should independently investigate the client’s
financial and legal affairs, including an analysis of the client’s
262
solvency.” This also would include “attempt[ing] to uncover any
existing, foreseeable or threatened claims.”263
Several scholarly sources have offered practical guidance on
ways to perform this due diligence, and steps attorneys can take
to avoid disciplinary sanctions arising from their involvement
with possibly fraudulent transfers. First, “counsel may wish to
obtain from his prospective client an affidavit reciting that the
client will not be rendered insolvent by the contemplated transfer
and that the elements inherent in the [jurisdiction’s fraudulent
264
transfer statute] are not present in the client’s case.” Similarly,
an attorney may ask a client to fill out a questionnaire pertaining
to the reasons the client is effecting the transaction.265 Furthermore, in addition to RPC 1.2(c) and the guidance set forth above,
an attorney must be mindful of Virginia Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.16 (“RPC 1.16”).266 RPC 1.16, similar to Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.16,267 dictates that an attorney who learns
of a client’s wrongful conveyances and cannot persuade the client
to disclose those transfers should consider withdrawing from representation.268 If the attorney is able to convince her client to reveal the transfers to the court, counsel also should make a good
faith effort to recover any amounts already transferred as a result
269
of fraudulent conveyances.
While the above guidance is well-intentioned and may indeed
provide for the appropriate actions in an ideal world, the authors
contend that such steps are not practical in the everyday practice

261. Kromash, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, at § 1.41 (explaining that, in regards to a lawyer’s ethical obligations when assisting a client in the transfer of assets, “it
is imperative for the attorney to conduct due diligence with respect to the client’s legal and
financial situation”).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Jerome Ostrov, Tax & Estate Planning with Real Estate, Partnerships & LLCs, §
11:8 (2d ed. 2010).
265. Id.
266. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.16 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
267. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (1980).
268. See Adrienne O’Connell McNamara & Carl A. Eklund, Ethical Quandaries of a
Debtor’s Lawyer, in REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES 243, 273 (Practising Law
Inst. 1993).
269. Id. at 272.
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of law. Furthermore, the language of the Rules disincentivizes
such actions. RPC 1.2(c)—specifically the “knowingly” requirement contained therein and examined in Section IV.A.1 above—
may have the effect of creating an “ostrich approach,” whereby attorneys are encouraged to “stick their heads in the sand” as it relates to the financial standing of their clients. For example, it is
well-established that a lawyer can rely on statements made by
270
his clients. Why then would an attorney dig any deeper into a
client’s financial standing than the client initially provides? Not
only would this serve to frustrate or possibly anger clients, but it
would also expose the lawyer to a potential RPC 1.2(c) violation.
While a thorough analysis of the changes that could or should be
made to the Rules in order to curb this temptation is beyond the
scope of this essay, it is one the Virginia State Bar’s Legal Ethics
Committee should consider undertaking in the near future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The object of this essay is to illuminate the line between ethical
asset protection strategies and unethical transfers. Although
fraudulent transfer law is, in many ways, the flip side of the asset
protection coin, these competing concepts are more than a distinction without a difference. The legal difference between the two
may, at times, be blurry at best. Nonetheless, an attorney can
make a reliable prediction as to the legal propriety of a client’s
asset protection goals through an analysis of a client’s creditor
situation, the badges of fraud surrounding a proposed transfer,
and a client’s financial circumstances.
In terms of the ethical difference, the contentious relationship
between (i) a lawyer’s duty to zealously represent his or her clients, (ii) a lawyer’s duty to abide by the ethical rules, (iii) the
amorphous nature of the Rules’ terminology, and (iv) the lack of
Virginia precedent creates a situation in which a bright line rule
is impossible to nail down. Admittedly, this essay may raise more
questions than it provides answers. However, it is the authors’
hope that at the very least, this essay has defined the ethical
boundaries of asset protection work and fraudulent transfer law.
The authors attempted, through this essay, to illuminate gray areas—situations in which it would be wise for lawyers to take the
additional steps outlined in Section V. Finally, it is the authors’
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sincere hope that this essay identifies those sections of the Rules
of which the Virginia State Bar’s Legal Ethics Committee can
provide further guidance or refinement to ensure that Virginia
practitioners not only will know there is an ethical distinction
and difference between asset protection planning and fraudulent
transfers, but also be able to clearly identify the difference.

